We address the problem of existence of the uniform value in recursive games. We give two existence results: (i) the uniform value is shown to exist if the state space is countable, the action sets are finite and if, for some a > 0, there are finitely many states in which the limsup value is less than a; (ii) for games with nonnegative payoff function, it is sufficient that the action set of player 2 is finite. The finiteness assumption can be further weakened.
Another value that was studied in the literature is the limsup value. The limsup value is the value of the game in which the overall payoff to player 1 is the lim sup of the daily payoffs. Maitra and Sudderth (1993) proved that the limsup value v exists under very mild assumptions. It is easy to see that if the uniform value exists, then v = v ∞ . Lehrer and Sorin (1992) gave an example of a Markov decision process (with countable state space) where lim n→∞ v n and lim λ→0 v λ exist and differ, and they both differ from the limsup value v.
Recursive games are stochastic games where the state space is divided into two sets S and T -nonabsorbing states and absorbing states. As long as the game is in S, the payoff is 0, whatever the players play. Once the game reaches a state in T , it remains in it with probability 1, whatever the players play.
Recursive games were introduced by Everett (1957) , who proved the existence of the limsup value v and of stationary ε-optimal strategies, when the state space and the action sets are finite.
In the present paper we provide conditions under which the uniform value exists in recursive games. First, we investigate games with countable state space and finite action sets. For such games, Secchi (1997) gave conditions under which one of the players has a stationary ε-optimal strategy (in the limsup sense), but his strategies need not be ε-optimal in a uniform sense. We prove that if the limsup value is positive on S and bounded away from zero, then the uniform value exists. We use this result to show that if, for some a > 0, there are only finitely many states in S where the limsup value is less than a, the game admits a uniform value.
We then show that if the game is positive, that is, if the payoff in absorbing states is always nonnegative, then the assumptions on the state space and the limsup value can be dropped, and it is enough to require that the action set of player 2 is finite. This finiteness assumption can be further weakened. It is enough that for every ε > 0 and every state s ∈ S player 2 has a mixed action that is ε-optimal in the game with continuation payoff lim sup λ→0 v λ , and this ε-optimal strategy guarantees that player 2 pays (on average) at most lim sup λ→0 v λ (s) + ε in this one-shot game.
The results of Rosenberg and Vieille (2000) , who study recursive games with incomplete information, imply that if the values of the discounted games converge uniformly (over the state space) as the discount factor goes to zero, then the uniform value exists. Their results are independent of ours.
The game is played as follows. An initial state s 1 is given. At any stage n ≥ 1, the current state s n is told to the players, the players choose actions a n and b n , possibly at random, and the next state s n+1 is drawn according to q(·|s n , a n , b n ). Once the game reaches a state s ∈ T , player 1 receives from player 2 a stage payoff g (s) , and the game remains in s forever.
It is usually important to specify what each player knows in any given stage about the past play of the other player. This is irrelevant for our result: the ε-optimal strategies that we construct have the feature that what a player does depends only on the sequence of states visited so far (including the current one). Therefore, provided the information available to a player enables him to recover this sequence, our results hold. For simplicity, we assume that, in any stage, each player knows the entire past play.
Strategies.
A and B are endowed with the σ -fields of Borel sets. The set of histories of length n is H n = × (A × B × ) n−1 , and the set of finite histories is H = n∈N H n , where N is the set of positive integers. The set of plays is H ∞ = ( × A × B) N . It is convenient to identify any h n ∈ H n with a cylinder set of H ∞ . The σ -algebra induced by H n over H ∞ is denoted by H n : it is the information available to the players at stage n. The product σ -field on H ∞ is H ∞ = σ (H n , n ≥ 1).
We let (A) and (B) denote the sets of probability measures over A and B, endowed with the weak- * topology.
A strategy of player 1 is a map σ : H → (A) (such that the restriction of σ to H n is measurable), with the interpretation that σ n (h n ) is the lottery used by player 1 to choose an action at stage n, if the history of play up to stage n is h n . It is called pure if σ (h n ) is a unit mass, for every h n ∈ H . A strategy σ can be equivalently viewed as a sequence (σ n ) n≥1 , where σ n : (H ∞ , H n ) → (A) is measurable with respect to H n . Strategies of player 2 are defined analogously.
A strategy σ is stationary if σ (h n ) depends only on the current state s n . Thus, a stationary strategy reduces to a family (x(s), s ∈ S), where x(s) ∈ (A) is the mixed move played whenever the current state is s. (This differs from the terminology used in gambling theory, where these strategies are called stationary families.)
The letters σ (resp. x) will always stand for a strategy (resp. stationary strategy) of player 1. τ and y stand for strategies and stationary strategies of player 2. The sets of strategies of the two players are denoted by S and T .
We denote by P s,σ,τ the law of play when the initial state is s, and the players follow the strategies σ and τ : P s,σ,τ is a probability distribution over (H ∞ , H ∞ ). Expectation w.r.t. P s,σ,τ is denoted by E s,σ,τ .
Let t = inf{n ≥ 1, s n ∈ T } be the termination stage, and set g n = g(s t )1 t≤n (payoff at stage n). Finally, denote by g n = 1 n n p=1 g p the average payoff up to stage n.
We assume w.l.o.g. that g ∞ ≤ 1.
Payoffs and value.
Two notions of value have been studied in the literature. The first is based on the payoff function γ :
A strategy of player 1 which achieves the sup up to ε in the sup inf is called ε-optimal. We say that such a strategy guarantees v − ε.
We recall a result, which is a particular case of the result of Maitra and Sudderth (1993) .
THEOREM 2 [Maitra and Sudderth (1993) (s, σ, τ 
the expected average payoff during the first n stages. DEFINITION 3. Let w : → R. We say that player 1 uniformly guarantees w if for every s ∈ and every ε > 0 there exists σ ε ∈ S and N ∈ N, such that
We also say that the strategy σ ε uniformly guarantees w − ε. Similarly, player 2 uniformly guarantees w if for every s ∈ and every ε > 0 there exists τ ε ∈ T and N ∈ N such that
DEFINITION 4. v ∞ : → R is the uniform value of the game if both players uniformly guarantee v ∞ .
A strategy that uniformly guarantees v ∞ − ε is called uniform ε-optimal. We point out that our definition is weaker than the definition in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994) , in that we allow N to depend on the initial state s.
By dominated convergence, lim n γ n (s, σ, τ ) = γ (s, σ, τ ) . Therefore, if the uniform value exists, it coincides with the limsup value.
The value of the n-stage game, that is, the game with payoff function γ n (s, σ, τ ) , is denoted by v n .
For every λ ∈ (0, 1) and every triplet (s, σ, τ ) 
denote the λ-discounted evaluation of payoffs.
Existence of the discounted value and the n-stage value was proved in a general setup [see, e.g., Nowak (1984a Nowak ( , b, 1985 or Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994) By the definition of the uniform value, whenever it exists we have v ∞ = lim n→∞ v n . One can also show that in that case v ∞ = lim λ→0 v λ .
Known results.
In this subsection we review conditions under which the uniform value is known to exist.
The first result, which was proved for general stochastic games, was given by Mertens and Neyman (1981) .
THEOREM 7 [Mertens and Neyman (1981)] . If the function λ → v λ has bounded variation for the norm · ∞ , then v ∞ exists.
In Rosenberg and Vieille (2000) , recursive games with incomplete information are studied. Their result implies the next theorem.
THEOREM 8 [Rosenberg and Vieille (2000) ]. If v λ converge uniformly to a limit, then v ∞ exists.
Finally, when the transition to states in S is independent of the actions of the players, one can drop the requirement on v λ . Formally, the next result is a byproduct of the last section of Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2001) .
THEOREM 9 [Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2001) ]. If (i) A and B are finite and (ii) for every s ∈ S and every S ⊆ S we have If the function g happens to be nonnegative, then the only condition that is required is that B is finite. One can replace the condition that B is finite by the following weaker condition.
THEOREM 12. Let the assumptions of Theorem 6 hold. If (i) g ≥ 0 and (ii) for every ε > 0 there exists a stationary strategy y ε = (y ε s ) for player 2, such that
where w(s) = lim sup λ→0 v λ (s), then the uniform value exists.
As we will see, if g ≥ 0, then for every s ∈ S, v λ (s) increases when λ decreases. Thus, w(s) = sup λ∈(0,1) v λ (s).
For each s ∈ S, y ε s is an ε-optimal strategy for player 2 in the one-shot game with payoff w(s ) dq(s | s, ·, ·). If B is finite, then any limit of discounted ε-optimal strategies in this game (as the discount factor and ε go to 0), satisfies (ii).
We now give an example that shows that Theorem 10 is in some respect tight. The example is of a game for which the set {s ∈ S, v(s) ≤ 0} is empty, but which has no uniform value. EXAMPLE 13. The state space is S ∪ T , where S = {1, 2, 3, . . .} ∪ {1 , 2 , . . .} and T = {t 1 , t −1 , t 2 }. Player 1 has a single action, and player 2 has two actions, {D, R}. Since player 1 is degenerate, we omit that player from the notation. States t 1 , t −1 , t 2 are absorbing, with absorbing payoff 1, −1, 2, respectively. The transition function is given by:
Graphically, the game looks as shown in Figure 1 . If the game reaches a state k , then after k stages it reaches state t 2 with probability 1. Hence v(k ) = 2 for every k. Since ∞ k=1 1/2 k+4 = 1/16, it follows that if the initial state is k, then the optimal strategy for player 2 is to play R forever. Hence v(k) = 1/2 k+3 . We shall now see that lim sup n→∞ v n (1) ≤ −1/8. Indeed, for a given n ∈ N, consider the following strategy τ of player 2: play R for the first n/2 stages, and then play L once (afterward, transitions are independent of the actions played by player 2). It is easy to verify that
3. Construction of an ε-optimal strategy. In this section we consider a recursive game that satisfies the following assumptions:
A.1. The limsup value v exists, and the function s → v(s) is measurable. A.2. There exists a stationary strategy x = (x s ) for player 1 such that, for every
A.3. There exists a stationary strategy y = (y s ) for player 2 such that, for every
Thus, for every s ∈ S the pair of strategies (x s , y s ) is optimal in the one-shot game with continuation payoff v.
Note that conditions A.1-A.3 hold under the assumptions of Theorem 10. We are going to construct a specific ε-optimal strategy for player 1. By symmetry, a similar construction would yield an ε-optimal strategy for player 2. In the next section, we shall argue that, under the assumptions of Theorem 10, these strategies are indeed uniformly ε-optimal.
Section 3.1 gives some results on the concatenation of ε-optimal strategies. Section 3.2 deals with recursive games in which the limsup value is bounded away from zero. Section 3.3 deals with general recursive games.
Preliminary results.
We first define terminating strategies. DEFINITION 14. We say that σ ∈ S is terminating if, for every initial state s and every τ ∈ T , t < +∞, P s,σ,τ -a.s.
For every strategy σ ∈ S and every finite history h n = (s 1 , a 1 , b 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ H n , we denote by σ h n the strategy induced by σ in the subgame defined by h n : for every finite history h, σ h n (h) = σ (s 1 , . . . , s n−1 , a n−1 , b n−1 , h).
Let σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ S, and let u be a stopping time, with values in N ∪ {+∞}. We define the strategy σ 1 uσ 2 as follows: play σ 1 up to u, then switch to σ 2 (and forget the history up to u). Formally, for every n ∈ N and every h n = (s 1 , a 1 , b 1 
. , s n ).
Similarly, if 0 < u 1 < u 2 < u 3 < · · · are stopping times and σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . are strategies, we define the strategy σ = σ 1 u 1 σ 2 u 2 · · · as follows:
We start by checking that the concatenation of two ε-optimal strategies is 2ε-optimal (Corollary 16).
LEMMA 15. Let σ 1 be an ε-optimal strategy and let s ∈ S. Let u be a stopping time. Assume that, for each τ , u < +∞, P s,σ 1 ,τ -a.s. One has
− ε − η for some τ ∈ T and η > 0. Let τ 1 be an η-optimal strategy of player 2. One has
COROLLARY 16. Let σ 1 and σ 2 be respectively ε 1 -and ε 2 -optimal strategies of player 1. Let u be a stopping time with P s,σ 1 ,τ -a.s. finite values, for every τ . Then σ 1 uσ 2 is ε 1 + ε 2 -optimal.
PROOF. Observe that
where the first inequality uses the ε 2 -optimality of σ 2 , and the second one uses Lemma 15. Observe that a recursive game that satisfies the condition of Proposition 17 need not be positive, and a positive recursive game need not satisfy the condition of Proposition 17.
Fix a recursive game that satisfies the condition of Proposition 17, and an ε > 0. The proof of Proposition 17 goes as follows. For every m we choose an ε/2 m+1 -optimal strategy σ m for player 1. We define a strategyσ by a suitable concatenation of the σ m 's. We then prove thatσ is terminating and ε-optimal.
Given σ ∈ S, we define the stopping time
Equivalently, t σ (h ∞ ) = inf{n ≥ 1, P s n ,σ hn ,τ (t < +∞) < ε for some τ }. It is the first stage after which the residual probability of termination in finite time is very small for some strategy of player 2.
LEMMA 18. For every σ, τ , min(t, t σ ) is P s,σ,τ -finite.
PROOF. Fix τ ∈ T and set t 1 = inf{n ≥ 1, P s,σ,τ (t < +∞|H n ) < ε}. Clearly, t 1 ≥ t σ , P s,σ,τ -a.s., so it suffices to prove that min(t, t 1 ) < +∞, P s,σ,τ -a.s.
Observe that the sequence (P s,σ,τ (t < +∞|H n )) n is a martingale under P s,σ,τ , which converges P s,σ,τ -a.s. to 1 t<+∞ , hence to 0 on the event {t = +∞}. Therefore t 1 < +∞ on the event {t = +∞}.
We need the following observation.
LEMMA 19. Let η > 0, and let σ ∈ S be an η-optimal strategy. For every s ∈ S,
PROOF. Fix τ ∈ T . Since the payoff function g is bounded by 1, one has
We obtain a terminating ε-optimal strategy σ of player 1 by concatenation of ε/2 n -optimal strategies. For every m ≥ 1, choose an ε/2 m+1 -optimal strategy σ m .
We define inductively a sequence (σ m ) of strategies as follows. Set σ 1 = σ 1 . Assume that σ m is defined. We write t m instead of t σ m . Set
In words, σ plays σ 1 until the residual probability of termination in finite time becomes very small. It then plays σ 2 until the residual probability again becomes very small, and so on up to infinity. Note that t m+1 > t m on the event {t m < +∞}, and in particular t m ≥ m. Moreover, by Lemma 18, min{t, t m } is P s,σ m ,τ -a.s. finite for every τ ∈ T , and therefore min{t, t m } is P s,σ ,τ -a.s. finite as well. Hence σ m+1 is well defined and coincides with σ m on H m . We let σ be defined byσ = σ m on H m . LEMMA 20. σ is terminating.
PROOF. Let τ ∈ T be arbitrary. For every m ∈ N, we have, by Lemma 19 and the definition of t m ,
As long as ε < a the result follows by the definition ofσ .
LEMMA 21. σ is ε-optimal.
PROOF. By Corollary 16 and since min{t, t m } is P s,σ ,τ -a.s. finite for every fixed τ ∈ T , σ 1 t 1 σ 2 . . . t m−1 σ m is ε/2 + ε/4 + · · · + ε/2 m -optimal. Since σ is terminating, γ (s, σ , τ ) = lim m→∞ γ (s, σ m , τ ) for every τ . In particular, σ is ε-optimal.
We show in an example that the existence of a terminating strategy relies crucially on the fact that v is uniformly bounded away from 0. EXAMPLE 22. Consider the following game, with dummy players (a Markov chain). T = {t 1 }, S = N and g(t 1 ) = 1. For every n ∈ N, q(t 1 |n) = 1 2 n+2 , and q(n + 1|n) = 1 − q(t 1 |n). One has v(n) = P n (t < +∞) = 1/2 n+1 > 0 for every n ∈ N. However, whatever the initial state, the probability that the game does not terminate in finite time is strictly positive.
3.3. The general case. In this section, we let be a general recursive game that satisfies assumptions A.1-A.3. Our goal is to construct ε-optimal strategies that are not necessarily uniform ε-optimal. For every ε > 0 let (ε) be the game with the following: (i) state space ε = S ε ∪ T ε , where S ε = {s ∈ S, v(s) ≥ 2ε} and T ε = T ∪ {s ∈ S, v(s) < 2ε}; (ii) action spaces A and B; (iii) payoff function that coincides with g on T and is defined as g ε (s) = v(s) for s ∈ T ε ; (iv) transitions on S ε are unchanged.
Intuitively, states with a value below 2ε are replaced by absorbing states with payoff which is equal to their limsup value.
Denote byṽ the limsup value of (ε), and byṽ λ the λ-discounted value of (ε). As we show below,ṽ = v, but v λ andṽ λ may differ. In particular, it will follow that, for every s ∈ S ε , v(s) ≥ 2ε. Hence we can apply the results from Section 3.2 to (ε). From now on we fix ε > 0 and denote byγ the payoff in (ε).
Let (α n ) be a bounded process on (H ∞ , (H n ), P), and let u ≤ u be two stopping times with values in N ∪ {+∞}. We say that (α n ) is a submartingale between u and u if, for each n, one has α n ≤ E(α n+1 |H n ) on the event {u ≤ n < u}. If (α n ) is a submartingale between u and u, andũ ≤ u is another stopping time with P-a.s. finite values, E[αũ|H u ] ≥ α u on the event {u ≤ũ}. We say that (α n ) is a submartingale up to u if it is a submartingale between 0 and u.
PROOF. Let σ ∈ S be a terminating δ-optimal strategy in (ε). Such a strategy exists by the previous section. Sett = inf{n ≥ 1, s n ∈ T ε }. By Lemma 15, 
Since the left-hand side coincides withγ (s, σ, τ ), this impliesṽ(s) ≥ v(s) − δ. Since δ is arbitrary, this yieldsṽ(s) ≥ v(s).

(s). Henceṽ(s) ≤ v(s).
In particular,ṽ(s) ≥ 2ε for every s ∈ S ε . For s ∈ S ε , we let σ * (s) denote a terminating ε 2 -optimal strategy for the initial state s, in the game (ε).
The strategy we define now has some features in common with strategies defined in Rosenberg and Vieille (2000) . Intuitively, it may be thought of as follows: play x whenever the current state belongs to T ε ; whenever the play enters S ε , say in state s, switch to σ * (s) until the play leaves S ε . As argued in Rosenberg and Vieille (2000) , this might involve too many switches. We refine this idea as follows.
Set
Graphically, one can look at the sequence of real numbers v(s n ). The stopping times u p (for p even) tell us when this sequence jumps above 2ε, and the stopping times u p (for p odd) tell us when this sequence jumps below ε.
Define σ = xu 2 σ * u 3 xu 4 σ * u 5 . . . as follows: play x from u 1 to u 2 , play σ * (s u 2 ) from u 2 to u 3 , x from u 3 to u 4 , σ * (s u 4 ) from u 4 to u 5 and so on. We prove below that σ is ε-optimal. In the next section, we show that it uniformly guarantees v − ε if S \ S ε is finite.
In Lemma 24, we prove a submartingale property for the sequence (v(s min(t,u p ) ) p . Fix τ ∈ T and for simplicity set P = P s,σ ,τ , E = E s,σ ,τ .
LEMMA 24. For every p ∈ N,
Observe first that, by Lemma 18, P(u 2p < t, min(t, u 2p+1 ) = +∞) = 0. Observe also that, by A. 2, (v(s n ) ) is a submartingale between min(t, u 2p+1 ) and min(t, u 2p+2 ) for every p. Therefore, on the event {u 2p+1 < +∞ = t = u 2p+2 }, v(s ∞ ) = lim n v(s n ) exists. Thus, the conditional expectation on the left-hand side is meaningful.
PROOF OF LEMMA 24. For even p, on the event t > u p , u p ) ) by the sampling theorem.
Since v(s u 2p ) ≥ 2ε and v(s u 2p+1 ) ≤ ε, N = sup{p ≥ 1, u 2p < +∞} is the number of upcrossings of the interval [ε, 2ε] by the sequence (v(s n )) n . An easy adaptation of the standard result on upcrossings [see Rosenberg and Vieille (2000) , Proposition 3] gives
is a submartingale. Moreover, by (1) and since |v(s n )| ≤ 1, one has sup p |ṽ p | ∈ L 1 . Therefore, (ṽ p ) converges P-a.s. and therefore (v(s min(t,u p 
Once again, by definition of σ * , one has P-a.s. u 2p+1 < +∞ on the event u 2p < +∞ = t. Therefore, on the event t = +∞ one has v(
4. Uniform optimality. In this section we prove Theorem 10. Thus, we assume that S is countable, that A and B are finite and that, for some a > 0, the set {s ∈ S, v(s) ≤ a} is finite. Fix ε ∈ (0, a/2) such that 2/ε 2 is an integer for the rest of the section. The set S\S ε defined in the previous section is also finite. We investigate the properties of the strategyσ that has been defined in the previous section.
We prove (Proposition 26) that under a terminating strategy, termination occurs in fact in bounded time.
PROPOSITION 26. Let s ∈ S be fixed and let σ ∈ S be a terminating strategy. For every η > 0, there exists N ∈ N, such that
PROOF. Assume that the result does not hold for some η > 0. Then, for each N ∈ N, there exists a pure strategy τ N such that
Since A and B are finite and S is countable, there exists a finite subset N of such that, for every τ ,
Clearly, one may choose the sequence ( N ) N to be nondecreasing. For each N , we partition the set of pure strategies of player 2 as follows: τ 1 and τ 2 in T are considered equivalent if they coincide on every history of length at most N − 1 which visits only states in N ; τ 1 N τ 2 if, for every n ≤ N , and every h n = (s 1 , a 1 , b 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ H n , one has τ 1 (h n ) = τ 2 (h n ) as soon as s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ N . Since N , A and B are finite, the number of equivalence classes for the relation N is finite. Notice that, if τ 1 N τ 2 , one has
Since ( N ) is nondecreasing, the partition into equivalence classes for N+1 refines the partition obtained for N . Therefore, one can construct a decreasing sequence (e N ) N of equivalence classes for ( N ) (i.e., each e N is an equivalence class for N ), such that, for each N , e N contains infinitely many of the strategies (τ p ) p≥N . By this procedure, one gets a pure strategy τ such that for every N there exists N ≥ N with τ N τ N . From (2) and (3) one obtains P s,σ,τ (t ≤ N) ≤ 1 − η/2 for every N . This contradicts the fact that σ is terminating.
4.1. Player 1 can uniformly guarantee v. We show that, in this case, the strategy σ that we defined in the previous section is uniformly ε-optimal. We first sketch the idea. Since A, B and S \ S ε are finite, there exists a finite subset S 1 of S ε such that P s,σ,τ (s u 2 / ∈ S 1 , u 2 < +∞) ≤ ε 3 , for every s ∈ S \ S ε , every σ ∈ S and every τ ∈ T . For each s ∈ S ε there exists N s ∈ N such that P s,σ * (s),τ (t > N s ) ≤ ε 3 for every τ ∈ T . Since S 1 is finite, N 1 = max S 1 N s is finite. This is used in the following way. Define an excursion above 2ε (an excursion in short) as the play between u 2p and u 2p+1 , for any p such that u 2p < +∞ [recall that these are stages where player 1 follows σ * (s 2p )]. One of the arguments of the previous section was that the expected number of excursions is at most 2/ε. Therefore, the probability that the total number of excursions during the play exceeds 1/ε 2 is small. By definition of S 1 , the probability that the number of excursions does not exceed 1/ε 2 and each of the excursions starts in S 1 is close to 1. Now, given an excursion starts from S 1 , the probability that it lasts more than N 1 stages is small. Therefore, the probability that the total number of excursions does not exceed 1/ε 2 and that no excursion exceeds N 1 stages is close to 1. This implies that, provided n is large, the expected frequency of stages which belong to an excursion is small. This is a crucial observation which allows comparison of the average of E[v(s n )] over the first n stages to the expected average payoff received up to stage n.
We put this in formal terms. For n ∈ N, define
These are all infinite plays where stage n is in an excursion.
LEMMA 27. For every τ ∈ T and every n ≥ N 1 /ε 3 ,
Denote by d p = min(u 2p+1 , t) − u 2p if u 2p < t, d p = 0 otherwise, the length of the pth excursion. Any excursion which starts in S 1 does not exceed N 1 in length, with high probability:
Therefore,
Denote E = {u 2/ε 2 < t, d p > N 1 for some p ≤ 1/ε 2 }, and by D = +∞ p=0 d p > 0 the total length of excursions. On the complement E c of E, D ≤ N 1 × 1/ε 2 . Thus,
One deduces that
nε 2 , which yields the result.
PROPOSITION 28. The strategy σ uniformly guarantees v − 16ε.
PROOF. We rewrite the submartingale property of (v(s n )) a bit differently. Our goal is to write explicitly an estimate of E[v(s n )] in terms of v(s) [see inequality (4) below]. Fix n 0 ≥ 1 and for p ∈ N set
Since v(s n ) is a submartingale between min(t, u 2p+1 ) and min(t, u 2p+2 ), one has
By construction of σ * one has
and otherwise
By taking expectations and letting p go to infinity, these inequalities yield
Observe now that g n ≥ v(s n ) − ε, except on k A k . One deduces that, for every n ≥ N 1 /ε 3 ,
where the second inequality uses (4) and Lemma 27.
REMARK 29. Notice that the finiteness of the set {s ∈ S, v(s) ≤ 2ε} is needed only to ensure the existence of the finite set S 1 ⊆ S 2ε . In particular, our proof works also if S ε is finite and {s ∈ S, v(s) ≤ 2ε} countable.
4.2.
Player 2 can uniformly guarantee v. We prove here that player 2 can uniformly guarantee v. For ε > 0, define S ε = {s ∈ S, v(s) ≤ −ε}, T ε = T ∪ {s ∈ S, v(s) > −ε}, and denote by ε the recursive game in which the set of absorbing states is T ε and the payoff in s ∈ T ε is v(s). By Proposition 17, there is a terminating strategy of player 2, which uniformly guarantees v + ε 2 in the game ε . By Remark 29 player 2 uniformly guarantees v.
It is not difficult to show that the stationary strategy defined as:
1. Play y λ on S ε (an optimal strategy in the discounted game). 2. Play y (limit of discounted optimal strategies) on T ε uniformly guarantees v − ε, provided λ is close enough to zero. This strategy was used by Thuijsman and Vrieze (1992) for the case |S| < +∞.
Positive recursive games.
In this section we prove Theorem 12.
PROOF. First we note that, for every fixed state s ∈ S and every pair of strategies (σ, τ ), γ λ (s, σ, τ (s) . We claim that w is the uniform value. We first check that player 1 can uniformly guarantee w. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) and let an initial state s be given. Choose λ ∈ (0, 1) such that v λ (s) ≥ w(s) − ε/4, and choose an ε/4-optimal strategy σ in the λ-discounted game. Let N 1 = N 1 (λ, ε) be sufficiently large such that (1 − λ) N 1 ≤ ε/4. Since g is bounded by 1, Therefore, player 1 can uniformly guarantee w.
We shall now construct a strategy for player 2 that uniformly guarantees w(s) + 2ε, given any initial state s. Denote, for every n ∈ N, ε n = ε/2 n . Define a strategy τ * for player 2 as follows. 
